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I. ABSTRACT
Today, network security in enterprises is mainly enforced
by firewalls guarding the perimeter of the network against an
ever increasing number of cyber threats. While inspecting and
enforcing security policies on every flow entering or leaving
the network, Perimeter Gateway Firewalls (PGF) provide
hardly any defense once the perimeter is breached, which
allows attackers and malware to easily compromise additional
hosts as we have seen in the recent outbreak of the WannaCry
worm.
To mitigate such outbreaks, enterprises usually rely on
costly Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and a centralized
update management to install security updates in a timely
manner. Both systems aim to minimize the window, in which
the enterprise network is susceptible to attacks. Yet, this is
a tedious process as the IPS requires an attack signature
and changes to the software stack demands thorough testing.
Furthermore, in the case of ZeroDay attacks no signatures and
updates are available. Hence, this often results in a widened
window in which the network remains vulnerable and an
increased risk.
A complimentary approach to alleviate these threats is
to quarantine malicious hosts on a network level, as this
can be deployed immediately and is independent from the
update procedure. To accomplish this, a fine-grained flow
selection and security control is needed. Whereas architectures
such as Ethane and more recent technologies like Software-
defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV) provide this required granularity, the adaptation
of these technologies in enterprise networks remains limited.
This is due to the fact, that the integration of new technologies
into an existing network infrastructure is a highly complex
task, as the compatibility with systems such as network
management and cloud management has to be assured for
production environments. In addition, SDN also broadens the
attack surface as novel networking devices and protocols are
deployed, which needs to be taken into account during the
risk assessment. Especially due to their critical role within the
softwarized management of the network, these devices and
protocols are high ranked targets for potential attackers and
thus require extensive testing and hardening.
In this work, we demonstrate the prospects of seamlessly
integrating SDN and NFV based security operations into the
existing enterprise network infrastructure to provide state-of-
the-art stateful firewalling for advanced packet filtering as
well as on-demand fine-grained flow separation and isolation
for the exterior and interior network. This is achieved by
levering an omnipresent firewall, which is based on cloud
principles enabling enhanced scalability and resilience. To
proactively ensure the robustness of deployed physical and
virtual devices, we present FlowFuzz a fuzzing framework for
SDN-enabled software and hardware switches. Here, we focus
on the OpenFlow protocol which handles the communication
between SDN-enabled switches and the central controlling
instance. Whereas the framework utilizes the output of conven-
tional tools such as AddressSanitizer for investigating software
switches, it also evaluates data obtained from side channels,
i.e., processing times and power consumption to identify
unique code execution paths within hardware switches to op-
timize the fuzzing process. We use our framework implemen-
tation to perform a first evaluation of the OpenVSwitch and
a total of four SDN-enabled hardware switches. We conclude
by presenting our findings and outline future extensions of the
fuzzing framework.
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